Patricia Christiansen vs. Holiday Rent-A-Car, dba Flexi-Lease Inc. and Devon K. Hammer vs. Harold T. Hinckley and Rex Howell, dba Airport Shuttle, Parking Don Maw and Beverly Maw vs. David Lingard, John Lingard, and Craig Lingard: Respondent\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Patricia Christiansen vs. Holiday Rent-A-Car, dba
Flexi-Lease Inc. and Devon K. Hammer vs. Harold
T. Hinckley and Rex Howell, dba Airport Shuttle,
Parking Don Maw and Beverly Maw vs. David
Lingard, John Lingard, and Craig Lingard:
Respondent's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Stevesn\' Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Respondents.
Samuel King; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Christiansen v. Flexi-Lease Inc, No. 919700.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3910
K " .; 
45.1 
en 
9 TKT T*WT7 C DOC,\rTNO #
 I N ,j H E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FLEXI-LEASE, INC ., dba HOLIDAY 
RENT-A-CAR, and DEVON K. HAMMER, 
Defendant. 
HOLIDAY RENT-A-CAR, dba FLEXI-
LEASE, INCc, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAROLD T. HINCKLEY and REX 
HOWELL, dba AIRPORT SHUTTLE 
PARKING, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
DON MAW and BEVERLY MAW, 
Intervening plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID LINGARD, JOHN LINGARD and 
CRAIG LINGARD, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 19700 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Robert L. Stevens 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
SL NELSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendants and Respondents 
Harold T. Hinckley and 
Rex Howell, dba Airport 
Shuttle Parking 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Samuel King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant Patricia 
Christiansen 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utaty €$£06^, 
riLfc 
MA1T 1 4 1984 
a « * . Supreme Court, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
FACTS 2 
SETTLEMENT 4 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 6 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT REGARDING ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I: 
IF THE INSURANCE POLICY EXTENDS COVERAGE TO 
HOLIDAY AS PLAINTIFF CLAIMS, THE COMPLAINT 
AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE SHOULD BE DISMISSED . . . 10 
POINT II: 
JUDGE DANIELS' DECISION REJECTING THE 
$246,000.00 JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE AND LIMIT-
ING PLAINTIFF' CLAIMS TO THE $15,000.00 OF 
ACTUAL DAMAGE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 12 
A. THE BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PROCURE 
INSURANCE ENTITLES THE AGGRIEVED PARTY 
TO COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES ACTUALLY 
CAUSED, IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE BREACH-
ING PARTY AS AN INSURER 12 
T i -
B. THE ASSIGNMENT OF HOLIDAY'S RIGHT OF 
ACTION AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE CANNOT 
INCREASE ANY CLAIM THAT HOLIDAY MAY 
HAVE HAD AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE 15 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS NO DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION 
IN HER OWN RIGHT AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE. 
AIRPORT SHUTTLE'S LIABILITY IN THIS 
CASE IS TIED SOLELY TO THAT OF HOLIDAY. 
PLAINTIFF, HAVING RELEASED HOLIDAY, 
DAMAGES ARE LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT PAID 
FOR THAT RELEASE 16 
D. AIRPORT SHUTTLE PARKING IS LIABLE ONLY 
FOR THE ACTUAL DAMAGE INCURRED BY HOLIDAY 
OF $15,000.00, AND NOT FOR THE CONTRIVED 
SHAM JUDGMENT OF $246,000.00 18 
E. EVEN IF AIRPORT SHUTTLE WERE AN INSURANCE 
COMPANY, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT UPHOLD 
CONTRIVED AND SHAM JUDGMENTS 25 
POINT III: 
JUDGE DANIELS' DETERMINATION DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED 31 
THE CONTRIVED JUDGMENT ENTERED INTO BY 
HOLIDAY AND PLAINTIFF IS EXCESSIVE ON ITS 
FACE AND A PATENT SHAM 31 
CONCLUSION 33 
T ii -
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Page 
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982) 13 
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 
409 N.E.2d 24 (111. 1980) 25 27 
Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 
460 (Utah 1969) 23 
Bendall v. White, 511 F.Supp. 793 (N.Dist. Ala. 1981). 25 
Bentley v. Fayas, 50 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 1951) 14 
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963) 15 
Coblentz v. American Surety Co., 416 F.2d 1059 
(5th Cir. 1969) 32 
Critz v. Farmers' Insurance Group, 230 Cal.App. 2d 
788, 12 A.L.R. 3d 1142 (Cal 1964) 21 
Deblon v. Beaton, 247 A.2d 172 (N.Jer 1968) 21 
Dennis v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 264 A.2d 436 
(Penn. 1970) 25 
First National Indemnity v. Mercado, 511 S.W.2d 
(Tex. 1974) 21 
Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 337 N.E.2d 23 (111. 1975). 25 
Holmstead v. Abbot GM Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 
624 (Utah 1972) 17 
Huffman v. Peerless Insurance Co., 193 S.E.2d 773 
(N.Caro. 1973) 25 
Klonis v. Armstrong, 436 S.2d 213 (Fla. 1983) 14 
Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982) 29 
Metcalf v. Hartford, 126 N.W.2d 471 (Neb. 1964) 21 32 
Municipal Service Real Estate Company v. D.B.M. 
Holding Corp., a Nat'l Sugar Refining Co. of New 
Jersey, 178 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1931) 22 
Redmond v. Petty Motor Co., 242 P.2d 302 (Utah 1952) . 13 
Reith-Riley Construction v. Auto Owners Mutal 
Insurance, 408 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. 1980) ." 19 
Schell v. Knickelbein, 252 N.W.2d 921 13 
Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
517 P.2d 262 (Ore. 1973) 25 
United Fire Insurance Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 
(7th Cir. 1978) 25 
Wiles v. Mullinax, 148 S.E.2d 229 (N.Caro. 1966) 19 
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 
(Utah 1967) 9 
Couch on Insurance 2d §74:54 13 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant Holiday 
Rent-A-Car claiming for personal injuries; Holiday filed a 
third-party action against Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell, dba 
Airport Shuttle claiming breach of a contract to procure 
liability insurance and seeking indemnification against 
plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff entered into a settlement with 
Holiday, andf through assignment, has succeeded to its claim 
against Airport Shuttle for breach of contract. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Contrary to the implication of plaintiff-appellant's 
brief herein, there are only two parties involved in this 
appeal. The interests of Holiday Rent-A-Car, Flexi-Lease Inc., 
defendants Maw and defendants Lingard have been fully assigned 
to plaintiff Patricia Christiansen. See copy of assignment Tr. 
178-180. In this proceeding, plaintiff seeks to enforce these 
claims against Airport Shuttle. 
The Home Insurance Company, listed by plaintiff-
appellant as an "unnamed" defendant is not a party to this 
proceeding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On November 28, 1983, Judge Scott Daniels entered 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff as assignee of defendant 
Holiday and against third-party defendants/respondents Airport 
Shuttle in the amount of $15,000.00. Judge Daniels1 judgment 
denied plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment against Airport 
Shuttle in the amount of $246,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmation of Judge Daniels' 
judgment of November 28, 19 83. 
FACTS 
This case arises from plaintiff's claims for personal 
injuries resulting from an accident which occurred on the 
premises of Holiday Rent-A-Car ("Holiday") near the Salt Lake 
City International Airport in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the 
timef plaintiff was employed by third-party defendants Howell 
and Hinckley, dba Airport Shuttle Parking ("Airport Shuttle"). 
Airport Shuttle and Holiday maintained their offices in the 
same building. The building was leased by Airport Shuttle, 
which in turn sublet a portion of it to Holiday. 
The accident occurred on February 29, 1980f when 
plaintiff walked into the Holiday portion of the building and 
stepped into an open manhole. The manhole had been temporarily 
uncovered by Holiday employees. Plaintiff suffered no broken 
bones but complained of bruising and soft-tissue injuries. 
Plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery for pain in the cervical 
and lumbar areas of her back and pain in her leg. 
Plaintiff's condition was treated conservatively with 
physical therapy and medication. Immediately after the 
accident, she was treated by a chiropractor and then went to an 
orthopedic surgeon. Upon directions from the orthopod, she 
followed a program of physical therapy at Holy Cross Hospital 
through April of 1980. She had occasional follow-up physical 
therapy treatments into early 1981. Her medical bills for all 
medical services at the time of settlement herein totals 
$5f0 29.58. Approximately one-half of this amount was made up 
of physical therapy charges at Holy Cross Hospital. Approxi-
mately $1,200.00 of the amount was for psychiatric care 
received in 1982 at the LDS Hospital Pain Clinic. (Tr. 22-87; 
480.) 
Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in negligence 
against Holiday (Tr. 2-3), in June of 1981. In February of 
1982f Holiday filed a third-party complaint over and against 
Airport Shuttle claiming that as part of the terms of their 
sublease agreement with Airport Shuttle, Airport Shuttle was 
obligated to procure premises liability insurance coverage for 
Holiday, which would have covered plaintiff's claims. The 
complaint alleged that no such coverage had been procured. 
(Tr. 108-111.) Airport Shuttle in its response to the third-
party complaint denied the existence of such an agreement. 
(Tr. 118-119.) 
The case was bifurcated for trial pursuant to order 
of Judge Croft on September 30f 1982. (Tr. 163-165) Under 
Judge Croft's order, the question of whether the sublease 
required Airport Shuttle to obtain liability insurance for 
Holiday was to be tried October 5, 1982; the issues raised by 
the original complaint to be handled subsequently. Trial by 
jury was conducted on the contract issue of the third-party 
complaint on October 5 and 6, 1982f Judge David Dee, pre-
siding. The single issue of whether Airport Shuttle contracted 
to extend their own liability insurance for the benefit of 
Holiday was submitted to the jury. The jury found in favor of 
Holiday. 
Judge Dee entered judgment determining that Airport 
Shuttle had entered a contract with Holiday pursuant to which 
Airport Shuttle was obligated to have Holiday insured under 
the Airport Shuttle Business Owners1 Insurance Policy. 
Pursuant to stipulation, Judge Dee further awarded a judgment 
against Airport Shuttle in favor of Holiday in the amount of 
$3,500.00 for attorneys1 fees incurred by Holiday in defending 
against plaintiff's original complaint herein. Judge Dee's 
order was restrictive and reserved all other questions of any 
further obligation of Airport Shuttle for later determination. 
(Tr. 293-297.) 
SETTLEMENT 
This issue is complicated by the fact that prior to 
the trial before Judge Dee, plaintiff and Holiday entered into 
a settlement agreement. This settlement agreement is a part of 
the court's record (Tr. 190-193.) 
Under the settlement agreement, Holiday Rent-A-Car 
paid $15,000.00 to plaintiff and assigned whatever rights it 
may have had against Airport Shuttle to plaintiff. Holiday was 
relieved of any further obligations under the complaint. The 
settlement agreement further provides that should plaintiff as 
assignee of Holiday's rights, succeed in recovering any amount 
from Airport Shuttle under the assignment, $10,000.00 of the 
$15,000.00 payment will be refunded to Holiday. 
The settlement then contains additional provisions 
contemplating the entry of a judgment in excess of $15,000.00 
against Holiday. It was agreed, however, that plaintiff would 
not execute on this judgment against Holiday but would only 
seek to recover it from Airport Shuttle. These provisions were 
designed to create a large windfall judgment against Airport 
Shuttle which would be assigned to plaintiff. 
The settlement agreement provided that plaintiff 
would submit her evidence of damage to a judge who would set a 
damage figure for her and enter judgment against Holiday in 
that amount. (Tr. 191.) Defendant Holiday would have no duty 
to pay the judgment. Plaintiff contemplated attempting to 
recover the judgment from Airport Shuttle or an insurance 
company. 
Plaintiff and defendant Holiday scheduled a hearing 
before the law and motion judge, Judge Phillip Fishier on 
October 1, 1982, to seek a damage determination from Judge 
Fishier. No formal notice of this hearing was given to Airport 
Shuttle and Airport Shuttle's attorney was only notified at the 
last minute by a telephone call from the attorney for Holiday, 
Dale Lambert. (Tr. 478-479.) 
Prior to the hearing before Judge Fishier, plaintiff 
and Holiday executed their settlement agreements in full. 
Judge Fishier refused to take any testimony on the merits of 
plaintiff's claim for her damages. Plaintiff's various 
affidavits purporting to outline the dollar value of her 
damages were filed, but not received as exhibits by Judge 
Fishier. (Minute entry Judge Fishier, Tr. 159.) Judge 
Fishier's minute entry states that the issues of proximate 
cause, negligence and damages raised by plaintiff's complaint 
would have to be heard at trial. 
Thereafter, Judge Fishier entered a judgment in favor 
of plaintiff against Holiday pursuant to stipulation in the 
amount of $246,033.08. This stipulation to an amount of 
damages by Holiday was not required by their settlement 
agreement. It was voluntarily entered into after they had 
relieved themselves of further responsibility in the case by 
entering into the settlement agreement. It was an effort to 
"set up" Airport Shuttle. 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
Following the bifurcated trials, Airport Shuttle 
moved for summary judgment in the case determining that it was 
indebted to Holiday and by assignment to plaintiff in the 
amount of $15,000.00, the sum which Holiday had been required 
to pay in order to settle this lawsuit. (Tr. 297-298.) For 
the purposes of the motion, Airport Shuttle did not contest the 
claim made by plaintiff that it had breached its obligation to 
obtain insurance coverage for the benefit of Holiday Rent-A-Car 
that would have covered plaintifffs injury. Plaintiff filed a 
cross-motion seeking an award of damages in the amount of the 
stipulated judgment of $246,033.08. (Tr. 439-440.) In support 
of her motion, plaintiff filed several affidavits attempting to 
give validity to the very large judgment figure. 
In response, Airport Shuttle filed the counter-
affidavit of Robert L. Stevens (Tr. 476-484) demonstrating 
that: 
1. Approximately a month and a half prior to the 
entry of the settlement at a pre-trial settlement conference 
before Judge Croft, plaintiffs had offered to settle their 
claim for the sum of $85,000.00, which figure was rejected by 
both Holiday and Airport Shuttle who made a combined responsive 
offer of settlement of $15,000.00. 
2. Plaintifffs attorneys had represented to 
attorneys for Airport Shuttle and Holiday that her total 
medical special damages as of October, 1982, were $5,029.58; 
approximately $2,500.00 of which consisted of physical therapy, 
approximately $1,200.00 of which consisted of psychiatric care 
and the remainder of which consisted of a series of doctors and 
chiropractors. 
3. At least one of plaintiff's doctors, Dr. David 
Howe, in his deposition, indicated his assessment of plain-
tiff's problems as "functional overlay" which he defined 
generally as psychosomatic problems. 
4. The attorney for Holiday, Dale Lambert, had 
commissioned an independent medical examination of plaintiff by 
an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Gene R. Smith, who concluded that 
plaintiff had suffered little or no physical injury as a result 
of her claimed accident. 
5. That in Robert L. Stevens1 opinion as an 
experienced litigation attorney in Salt Lake City, the stipu-
lated settlement of $246,000.00 entered in this matter as a 
judgment against Holiday Rent-A-Car bore no relation of any 
kind to plaintiff's injuries and was hundreds of thousands of 
dollars more than any reasonable or fair settlement that would 
have been reached in good faith in this matter. 
No objection was made to any of the facts contained 
in this affidavit and no responsive affidavit disputing these 
facts was filed. In their reply memorandum, Airport Shuttle 
took the position that the stipulated judgment of nearly a 
quarter of a million dollars was excessive on its face and a 
patent sham and should be rejected by the court. (Tr. 446-
460.) Airport Shuttle also took the alternative position that 
if the court was not disposed to ignore the stipulated judgment 
as a sham, Airport Shuttle should be allowed the opportunity to 
conduct discovery and participate in open hearing as to the 
reasons and support for this very large figure. (Tr. 457-460.) 
The cross-motions for summary judgment were heard 
before Judge Daniels and he issued a memorandum decision on 
September 23, 1983. (Tr. 485-488.) Judge Daniels determined 
that Airport Shuttle, as a partnership of individuals and not 
an insurance company, was not liable for the "huge" judgment 
but was only liable for the actual damages to Holiday which 
were $15,000.00. 
Judge Daniels granted plaintiffs a second hearing on 
the issue and entered an order reaffirming his memorandum 
decision in determining that if Airport Shuttle breached its 
obligation to secure insurance which would have protected 
Holiday in this case, judgment against Airport Shuttle is to be 
awarded in the amount of $15,000.00). (Tr. 500-501.) Judge 
Daniels, having reached this conclusion, found it unnecessary 
to deal with the question of collusion and sham in connection 
with the quarter million dollar stipulated judgment. 
Plaintiff thereafter filed her notice of appeal 
herein. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT REGARDING ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff/appellant's brief at pages 15 through 25 
and at numerous other locations contains repeated references to 
suppositions and speculations regarding insurance coverage for 
Airport Shuttle in this case and regarding Airport Shuttle's 
legal representation. These suppositions are confused, 
misleading and flatly inaccurate. Suggestions are raised 
without foundation which have no relevance to this appeal 
proceeding and no basis in fact. 
Airport Shuttle objects to the inclusion of this 
material in plaintiff's brief. Under authority of Young v. 
Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108 433 P.2d 846.(Utah 1967), the con-
sideration of whether liability insurance is available or not 
available to Airport Shuttle is irrelevant and prejudicial to a 
fair consideration of the issues at hand. Plaintiff's attempt 
to interject such considerations before this court is 
improper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF THE INSURANCE POLICY EXTENDS COVERAGE TO HOLIDAY 
AS PLAINTIFF CLAIMS, THE COMPLAINT AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The third-party complaint filed herein against 
Airport Shuttle seeks damages arising from Airport Shuttle's 
breach of an obligation to procure certain liability insurance. 
Plaintiff, as the assignee of Holiday, stands in Holiday's 
shoes and succeeds to its interests under this third-party 
complaint. 
Plaintiff, however, takes the position in its brief 
herein, and has repeatedly argued in the court below, that 
Airport Shuttle did, in fact, secure insurance for the benefit 
of Holiday through The Home Insurance Company. If such is the 
case, Airport Shuttle did not breach any obligation to Holiday 
and the third-party complaint should be dismissed. 
At Point I of the argument section of plaintiff's 
brief, plaintiff claims that Airport Shuttle personnel did, in 
fact, procure insurance for Holiday Rent-A-Car's benefit 
through The Home Insurance Company. This claim is maintained 
throughout all of the arguments and factual statement of 
plaintiff's brief. 
It was the belief of Rex Howell, Harold Hinckley, and 
Airport Shuttle that such insurance coverage for Holiday was 
not contemplated by their contract. Airport Shuttle employees 
made no effort to get such insurance coverage (See Trial 
Testimony of Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell Tr. 534-590.) 
Contrary to the implication in plaintiff's brieff Airport 
Shuttle's attorney made no representation to any court herein 
that he believed The Home insurance policy covered Holiday. 
Airport Shuttle has not contested the allegation in the 
third-party complaint that no insurance was obtained for the 
benefit of Holiday. 
Plaintiff, nevertheless, has persisted in her claim 
that insurance coverage does extend to Holiday as a result of 
Airport Shuttle's actions. Clearly plaintiff cannot have it 
both ways. Either Airport Shuttle breached its contract and 
there is no insurance or there is insurance and Airport Shuttle 
is not in breach and not liable. 
Airport Shuttle submits that if plaintiff has 
determined to her own satisfaction that insurance coverage does 
exist, then it would be inequitable to allow her to recover 
against Airport Shuttle in this action based upon breach of 
contract. 
POINT II 
JUDGE DANIELS1 DECISION REJECTING THE $246,000.00 
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE AND LIMITING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
TO THE $15,000.00 OF ACTUAL DAMAGE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Since Holiday was able to settle plaintiff's case as 
against it for the amount of $15,000.00, the lack of insurance 
available to Holiday has only caused damages of $15,000.00 
worth. 
The fact that after settling out of the case, Holiday 
voluntarily entered into a contrived judgment which 
was beyond and outside the requirements of its settlement 
agreement, in the amount of $246,000.00, can have no relevance 
or bearing on Airport Shuttle's obligations. 
A. THE BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PROCURE INSURANCE 
ENTITLES THE AGGRIEVED PARTY TO COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES 
ACTUALLY CAUSED, IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE BREACHING PARTY AS 
AN INSURER. 
Under the facts of this case as determined at trial, 
Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with Holiday under 
which it was obligated to procure liability insurance. For the 
purposes of its motion for summary judgments, Airport Shuttle 
conceded that it had breached this obligation and procured no 
such insurance; and that had it purchased such insurance, that 
insurance would have extended coverage to plaintiff's claimed 
damages. 
A contract to procure insurance is no different from 
any other contract that may be entered into between two 
independent parties. Any damages resulting from a breach are 
to be measured by the traditional contract measure of damages. 
The damages in general, for the breach of a 
contract are properly measured by the amount 
necessary to place the non-breaching party in 
as good a position as if the contract had 
been performed. 
Alexander v. Brownf 646 P.2d 692 
(Utah 1982). 
In a case alleging a breach of a contract to procure 
insurance, the inquiry is to find the actual damage or lost 
caused to the non-breaching party. 
Generally, assuming sufficient interest or 
other recognized consideration, or where one 
agrees to procure the issuance of insurance 
on a property of another, affording pro-
tection against designated risks, and fails 
to do so, he will be held liable, within the 
amount of the proposed insurance, for the 
loss attributed to his default. 
Couch on Insurance 2d §74:54. 
The party who undertakes an obligation to procure 
insurance does not, himself, become an insurer. Redmond v. 
Petty Motor Co., 242 P.2d 302 (Utah 1952). None of the special 
duties imposed on an insurer apply to him. His liability upon 
breaching that contract is to pay the actual damages incurred 
and nothing more. Schell v. Knickelbein, 252 N.W.2d 921. 
The importance of the distinction that Airport 
Shuttle is a partnership of two private individuals and is not 
an insurance company cannot be over-emphasized. In many 
reported decisions dealing with a breach of contract to procure 
insurance, this distinction is of little or no consequence and 
is glossed over by the courts. However, in this case as in 
others, the distinction is critical. 
In the case of Bentley v. Fayas, 50 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. 
1951), the court emphasized this point as follows: 
The liability of one who breaches a contract 
to procure insurance as to pay damages, and 
is not that of an insurer. In many fact 
situations, the end result of the amount with 
which the party guilty of the breach may be 
required to pay to the party sustaining the 
loss would be the same, whichever of the two 
theories of liability be adopted. However, 
in situations like the instant case, radi-
cally different results would be obtained, 
depending on which of the two theories be 
adopted. It is therefore essential that the 
correct theory of liability be applied here. 
50 N.W.2d at page 409. 
See also the case of Klonis v. Armstrong, 436 S.2d 
213 (Fla. 1983). In the Klonis case, plaintiffs carried a 
homeowner's policy through their insurance agent, Armstrong. 
After the inception of the policy, plaintiffs attempted to 
obtain a special policy through agent Armstrong for the 
insurance of listed property. This policy would have been 
primary insurance on the property. Armstrong attempted to 
obtain this insurance through Lloyds of London, but failed. The 
property involved was stolen. The homeowner's carrier paid for 
part of the loss and attempted to subrogate against the agent 
for his negligent conduct in attempting to get the Lloyds' 
policy, which would have saved them from any loss. The Florida 
court rejected this contention stating as follows: 
Consolidated also argues that Armstrong 
became, in effect, a primary insurance 
carrier by virtue of his unfulfilled promise 
to secure the primary insurance coverage and, 
therefore, became liable to Consolidated upon 
equitable subrogation principles . . . But 
this argument is likewise based upon an 
erroneous premise, i.e., that Armstrong's 
legal obligation to Klonis was equivalent to 
the insurance contract made by a primary 
insurance carrier. Armstrong's liability was 
not co-extensive with the Lloyd's policy 
originally issued and then later cancelled. 
On the contrary, Armstrong's liability was 
for damages resulting from his negligence or 
breach of contract in failing to obtain 
insurance coverage. 
436 S.2d at page 217. 
B. THE ASSIGNMENT OF HOLIDAY'S RIGHT OF ACTION 
AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE CANNOT INCREASE ANY CLAIM THAT HOLIDAY 
MAY HAVE HAD AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE. 
In the instant case, Holiday has chosen to assign its 
right of action against Airport Shuttle to plaintiff. The 
mere fact of this assignment cannot in any way increase or vary 
the size or character of Airport Shuttle's obligation to 
Holiday. To the contrary, an assignment does not change the 
breaching party's obligation whatsoever. 
In the case of Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 
1963), this court considered a matter involving the assignment 
of a right to recover for real estate broker's commissions. 
Questions were raised as to the scope of rights the assignee 
received. This court commented: 
It is elementary that plaintiff Cheney, as 
assignee of Real Estate Exchange, could have 
nothing more than its assignors, and is bound 
by any waiver, relinquishment or change of 
rights which had occurred by virtue of its 
execution of the new agreement. 
381 P.2d at page 91. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Holiday 
suffered damage of $15f000.00 by virtue of a lack of liability 
insurance covering it for plaintiff's claims. Clearly, having 
expended no more than $15f000.00f Holiday's claim against 
Airport Shuttle is restricted to that amount. 
Under the rationale of the Cheney case, supra, 
plaintiff, as the assignee of Holiday stands in the shoes of 
Holiday. Plaintiff can take no more than Holiday had and is 
similarly restricted to the $15,000.00 figure. 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS NO DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION IN HER 
OWN RIGHT AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE. AIRPORT SHUTTLE'S LIABILITY 
IN THIS CASE IS TIED SOLELY TO THAT OF HOLIDAY. PLAINTIFF, 
HAVING RELEASED HOLIDAY, DAMAGES ARE LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT PAID 
FOR THAT RELEASE. 
Plaintiff's complaint pleads cause of action only 
against Holiday. Plaintiff has asserted no cause of action in 
her own right as against Airport Shuttle. Indeed, the 
undisputed fact is that plaintiff was an employee of Airport 
Shuttle and her only right of recovery against them would be 
subject to the Workmen's Compensation Laws. 
It is further undisputed that plaintiff has finally 
and fully settled her case with Holiday upon payment of 
$15,000.00 and the assignment of Holiday's rights against 
Airport Shuttle. The Release of All Claims against the sole 
tort-feasor cuts off any right plaintiff might have to increase 
her claim. 
The case of Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 493 
P.2d 624 (Utah 1972) involved a somewhat similar situation. In 
the Holmstead case, plaintiff claimed personal injuries 
resulting from an automobile accident. Defendant's vehicle was 
driven by Gideon Allen in the course and scope of his employ-
ment for defendant. Prior to the filing of the action, 
plaintiff made a settlement with Mr. Allen for his insurance 
policy limits of $10,000.00. The settlement was handled under 
a covenant not to sue. Plaintiff attempted to expressly 
reserve rights against Abbott GM Diesel. Plaintiff then 
proceeded to file a complaint against Abbott GM Diesel. 
Abbott GM Diesel filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the basis of the settlement between plaintiff and Allen. 
Abbott GM argued that since it was not a joint tort-feasor, but 
rather was only vicariously reliable for Allen's negligence, 
the covenant not to sue, which in essence released Allen, must 
also release Abbott GM. The district court denied this motion. 
On appeal, this court reversed. 
The court reasoned that since Abbott GM's liability, 
if any, to plaintiff was based entirely on the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, and since Mr. Allen had effectively been 
released by his settlement, that no cause of action can be 
brought against Abbott GM. The mere fact that plaintiff had 
attempted to retain her cause of action against Abbott GM 
through wording in the agreement with Mr. Allen was not 
controlling. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the liability of 
Airport Shuttle is only for that negligence and liability that 
may be assessed against Holiday. Holiday, having been 
effectively released by a covenant not to sue, upon payment of 
$15,000.00, Airport Shuttle cannot be liable for more than that 
amount. 
D. AIRPORT SHUTTLE PARKING IS LIABLE ONLY FOR THE 
ACTUAL DAMAGE INCURRED BY HOLIDAY OF $15,000.00, AND NOT FOR 
THE CONTRIVED SHAM JUDGMENT OF $246,000.00. 
In the instant case, plaintiff is attempting to 
enforce a huge stipulated judgment which is subject to a 
covenant not to execute in favor of a judgment debtor against 
two private individuals who do not compose an insurance 
company. 
Plaintiff's brief herein, cites a lengthy string of 
cases purporting to support this proposition. However, none of 
plaintiff's cited cases involve the instant situation. 
Plaintiff's cases can generally be divided into 
two groups. Some of the cases involve a breach of contract to 
procure insurance. But none of these cases involve a contrived 
judgment subject to a covenant not to execute in favor of the 
tort-feasor. 
Some of plaintiff's other cases involve a stipulated 
judgment and a covenant not to execute. But each of these 
cases is an action against an insurer that has abandoned its 
insured, not a breach of a contract to provide insurance. 
Plaintiff asks this court to extend the concept of stipulated 
settlements subject to covenants not to execute beyond the 
bounds to which any court has previously extended it. 
The first group of plaintiff's cases, those in which 
a contract to procure insurance is involved but no special 
judgment and covenant appears is typified by the case of Wiles 
v. Mullinaxf 148 S.E.2d 229 (N.Caro. 1966). 
In the Wiles case, plaintiff contacted defendant, an 
insurance broker, and requested the issuance of certain 
Workmen's Compensation insurance. Defendant agreed to provide 
the insurance, but failed to do so. After an accident 
occurred, then plaintiff was forced to spend a total of 
$9,300.00 in compensation and legal fees that would have been 
covered, plaintiff sued defendant. There was no questions in 
this case that plaintiff was suing for the actual dollar amount 
expended and not for a contrived sham and excessive judgment. 
There was no question that plaintiff had direct liability to 
pay these amounts, and that they had been paid. The North 
Carolina Court recognized the rule that one who contracts to 
procure insurance and fails to do so to the detriment of the 
other party, the contract is obligated to repay that party's 
damages arising therefrom. 
In a similar vein, see the case of Rieth-Riley 
Construction v. Auto Owners Mutual Insurance, 408 N.E.2d 640 
(Ind. 1980). The Rieth-Riley case involved a lease agreement 
pursuant to which a Mr. Hunt leased a,truck to Rieth-Riley 
Construction. Under the terms of the lease, Rieth-Riley was 
obligated to provide liability insurance for the truck. 
Rieth-Riley failed to obtain the insurance. 
When an accident occurred injuring a third party, the 
truck owner was sued. The owner's insurance carrier paid 
$100,000.00 in settlement of the action. The insurance company 
then filed an action against Reith-Riley seeking subrogation 
for the $100,000.00 payment on the grounds that Rieth-Riley had 
been obligated to procure public liability insurance and had 
failed to do so. Once again, the case did not involve any 
contrived settlements or "covenants not to execute" connected 
with stipulated judgments. To the contrary, the amounts 
involved had been paid in full as an obligation of the truck 
owner. 
The only cases cited by plaintiff in which a stipu-
lated judgment subject to a "covenant not to execute" was 
upheld against the third-party, were cases where an insurer was 
involved and had improperly failed to meet its duty to defend 
its insured. While Airport Shuttle disagrees with the approach 
taken in these cases, and cites the court to contrary 
authority, infra, it is clear that these cases do not apply to 
the situation of Airport Shuttle as a non-insurer. 
Each of these cases reflect distinctions from the 
instant case, such as the determination of damages by a judge 
or jury rather than by stipulation, the actual payment of 
damages or a part of them, etc., each of the cases emphasizes 
the stringent obligations upon the defendant as an insurer 
arising from its duty to defend under its policy and its duty 
to handle an adjust the case in good faith. See, for example, 
Critz v. Farmers' Insurance Group, 230 Cal.App. 2d 788, 12 
A.L.R. 3d 1142 (Cal. 1964), which bases its finding on the 
breach of insurer's duty to settle in good faith; Metcalf v. 
Hartford, 126 N.W.2d 471 (Neb. 1964), based upon a breach of a 
duty to defend, and First National Indemnity v. Mercado, 511 
S.W.2d (Tex. 1974), breach of duty to defend. 
The importance of this distinction is emphasized by 
the case of Deblon v. Beaton, 247 A.2d 172 (N.Jer. 1968) as 
cited and quoted by plaintiff in her brief. The New Jersey 
court stated: 
Thus, Jersey argues that plaintiff is 
precluded because of its liability under its 
policy is "to pay on behalf of the insured, 
all sums which the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages" and its 
insured cannot become "legally obligated to 
pay" anything because of the covenant not to 
sue. Such a conclusion might be tenable if 
the policy was one of indemnity against loss, 
rather than insurance against liability. 
247 A.2d at p. 175 (Emphasis 
added). 
Airport Shuttle submits that in the instant case, its 
obligation is akin to that of indemnity. It is not a 
liability. 
Plaintiff's brief places special emphasis on the case 
of Municipal Service Real Estate Company v. D.B.M. Holding 
Corp., a Nat'l Sugar Refining Co, of New Jersey, 178 N.E. 745 
(N.Y. 1931). This case is misdescribed in plaintiff's memo-
randum. The case involved a case in defects and title to 
property. The plaintiff's sued D.B.M., from whom they had 
purchased the property under warranties of title under their 
deed. D.B.M. wished to plead in National Sugar Refining, who 
had conveyed the premises to them with the same warranties of 
title. National Sugar, therefore, was not sued directly by 
plaintiff. Nevertheless, they attempted to interpose 
defenses relating to the claim between defendant and plaintiff. 
The case was brought to the New York Court of Appeals 
on certified questions as to whether, under the particular 
rules and statutes in effect at that time, National Sugar could 
raise these defenses. The court determined that the defenses 
could not be raised by the third-party and remanded the case. 
No contrived judgment, stipulated judgment or covenant not to 
execute was involved. 
In commenting on the decision, the court held: 
The statute does not provide expressly or by 
fair implication, that a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff against one defendant shall 
constitute a binding adjudication against the 
third person brought in as an additional 
party defendant. It provides only for such 
judgment against the additional defendant as 
"may be proper." 
A "proper judgment" is, of course, a judgment 
rendered in accordance with due process of 
law after a trial in which a party against 
whom the judgment is rendered has had fair 
opportunity to present his evidence or 
defense in answer to the claim which is 
adjudicated against him. The statute 
contemplates that the claim by the original 
defendant against the indemnator shall be 
alleged in a supplemental pleading. 
178 N.E. at page 746 (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, the municipal service case make it clear that a 
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 set-up" stipulated judgment is not contemplated. The case 
stands solidly for the proposition that damage awards are to be 
fairly litigated by a fair trial on the merits. 
Plaintiff further places reliance on the Utah case of 
Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1969). This reliance is not well-founded. The Ammerman case 
involved an automobile injury in which plaintiff sued defen-
dant Soliz. Soliz had an insurance policy with Farmers with 
limits of $10,000.00. After the case was filed, plaintiff 
offered to settle for $9,000.00. Farmers rejected the offer. 
The case went to trial and a jury verdict was returned of 
$15,282.00. Farmers paid its $10,000.00 limit and left Soliz 
with an excess judgment of $5,282.00. At this point, Soliz 
entered into an agreement with plaintiff, pursuant to which he 
agreed to cooperate in seeking to have Farmers satisfy the 
excess and plaintiff agreed they would not execute on the 
judgment against him directly. 
Plaintiff thereafter sued Farmers directly. Farmers 
was granted summary judgment on the theory that the agreement 
with Soliz was in accord and satisfaction and eliminated all 
liability including that of his insurer. On appeal, this court 
reversed and remanded for trial on the merits, determining that 
no accord and satisfaction had been reached. 
The Ammerman case is distinguishable from the instant 
case in several important respects. Firstf it involves a claim 
against an insurance company sounding in bad faith under which 
it is claimed that the insurance company failed to look out for 
the interests of its insuredf and should have settled for 
$9,000.00. 
Second, it involves a damage amount set by jury 
verdict and not by contract settlement in connection with a 
covenant not to execute. 
Third, it involves a situation where a judgment was 
entered against the insured and was an actual liability against 
him before any assignment of his right against his insurance 
company was made. As a consequence, the judgment was a valid 
injury and damage to the insured. 
Conversly, in the instant case, the $246,000.00 
judgment freely stipulated to by Holiday was only entered and 
agreed to after they had been released of all liability in this 
case. It was a voluntary assumption of liability as opposed to 
a judicial decree of liability. No jury or other fact-finder 
was involved in the determination of the amount, whether it was 
$1.00 or $1,000,000.00 made no difference to Holiday. 
The law regarding the breach of contracts to procure 
insurance is discussed, supra and clearly holds that private 
individuals, such as Airport Shuttle are liable only for the 
actual damages and detriment visited upon an aggrieved party 
such as Holiday, they are not liable for the sham and contrived 
judgments such as plaintiff would like to collect. 
E. EVEN IF AIRPORT SHUTTLE WERE AN INSURANCE 
COMPANY, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT UPHOLD CONTRIVED AND SHAM 
JUDGMENTS. 
There is a split of authority among the various 
jurisdictions as to whether contrived settlements in which a 
tort-feasor submits to a judgment for which he has no liability 
and may be enforced against his insurance company. Airport 
Shuttle submits that the better reasoned line of cases rejects 
such judgments as a sham in violation of due process deter-
mination of true and fair damages. Dennis v. New Amsterdam 
Casualty Co.f 264 A.2d 436 (Penn. 1970); Huffman v. Peerless 
Ins. Co.y 193 S.E.2d 773 (N.Caro. 1973); Stubblefield v. St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 517 P.2d 262 (Ore. 1973); 
Bendall v. White, 511 F.Supp. 793 (N.Dist. Ala. 1981); United 
Fire Insurance Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978); Gatto 
v. Walgreen Drug Co., 337 N.E.2d 23 (111. 1975) and American 
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 409 N.E.2d 24 (111. 
1980) . 
The underlying fault that each of these cases finds 
with these contrived settlement agreements that the insured has 
no obligation to pay the stipulated judgment. The settlement 
by the insured under circumstances which prevent any recovery 
from him whatsoever, creates no legal obligation on his part. 
To the contrary, the express terms of his settlement agreement 
relieve him from any obligations. The insurance policies 
dealt with in these cases insure an individual against damages 
which he shall become "legally obligated to pay." The court's 
analysis is straightforward in determining that a judgment for 
which an insured is not "legally obligated" is not covered by 
insurance. 
The Stubblefield case is a good example and closely 
analagous to the instant case. In this case, Stubblefield, a 
doctor, was sued by the husband of one of his patients for 
criminal conversation and alienation of affections. 
Stubblefield tendered the defense of the action to his mal-
practice insurer, St. Paul. St. Paul refused to defend, 
apparently on the ground that Stubblefield's actions were 
intentional and not covered by his policy. 
Stubblefield went ahead and settled the action with 
the plaintiff, under which a judgment for $50,000.00 was 
entered against him. However, prior to the entry of the 
judgment, Stubblefield entered into an arrangement with plain-
tiff whereby he paid the total sum of $5,000.00, and received a 
"covenant not to execute" which restricted plaintiff from 
executing on the judgment against Stubblefield and required him 
to go after the insurance company only. Stubblefield also 
executed an assignment of his rights against his insurance 
company to plaintiff. As the Oregon court has pointed out, it 
is particularly important that Stubblefield entered into this 
agreement and was fully protected before the entry of any 
judgment. 
The settlement agreement was substantially identical 
to that in the instant case whereby Holiday paid a sum to 
plaintiff in settlement of the action and assigned its rights 
over and against Airport Shuttle to plaintiff. Only then did 
Holiday submit to the quarter million dollar judgment. 
In ruling on the casef the Oregon Supreme Courtf 
sitting en banc found the insurance company had no liability. 
The court stated: 
The insurance policy provided that "the 
company will indemnify the insurer for all 
sums which the insured shall be legally 
obligated to pay as damages and expenses . . 
. on account of . . . personal injury." 
Assuming, without deciding that plaintiff 
suffered "personal injuries" which were 
within the coverage of the policy, the result 
of the "separate covenant not to execute" was 
the amount which the insured in this case was 
"legally obligated" to pay to plaintiff as 
damages for such personal injuries was the 
sum of $5 ,000.00. The insured agreed, 
however, to pay that amount himself and that 
amount was expressly excluded from the 
assignment and was reserved for the insured. 
It follows that by the terms of the assign-
ment in this case, plaintiff acquired no 
rights which were enforceable by it against 
defendant. 
517 P.2d at page 270. 
See also, the case of United State Fire Insurance Co. 
v. Lay, supra. This case involved a wrongful death action for 
the death of Lay, resulting from a motor vehicle accident 
involving a truck owned by Comador. Comador had a $100,000.00 
primary insurance policy and a $1 ,000,000.00 insurance policy. 
In anticipation of the wrongful death action, the primary 
insurer negotiated a settlement with plaintiffs for $70,000.00. 
They granted release to the insured and the primary insurer 
from any further payment as a result of judgment, but attempted 
to retain a shot at the excess insurer for those amounts that 
might be assessed by judgment in excess of $100,000.00. 
(Plaintiff's were waiving the right to recover amounts between 
$70,000.00 and $100,000.00.) 
Plaintiff then proceeded to file a wrongful death 
action against the insured. The primary insurer purported to 
appear and defend on behalf of the insured. No litigation took 
place and the parties stipulated to a judgment of $150,000.00. 
Plaintiff then tried to collect the $50,000.00 against the 
excess insurer. 
The Seventh Circuit refused to accept the contrived 
settlement and sham judgment. The court commented: 
It [Comador] was affectively released from 
all liability in excess of $70,000.00 by that 
settlement agreement executed before the 
action against it was commenced. The agreed 
judgment did not purport to impose liability 
on Comador. Because Comador was not, and 
could not be liable for an amount in excess 
of $100,000.00, the obligation of the excess 
carrier to indemnify Comador never arose. 
It is argued on behalf of the administrix 
that the excess policy is not a true indem-
nity policy because it does not require that 
the insured actually pay the judgment before 
liability attaches. See 7 J. Appleman 
Insurance Law and Practice §7261 (1962). 
Whether or not the policy is one of indemnity 
and technical sense, it is in substance, a 
contract for indemnity against liability. 
The obligation to pay does not arise until 
the insured becomes liable. The excess 
carrier has no obligation whatsoever unless 
and until the insured becomes liable. 
* * * 
Moreover, the settlement agreement terminat-
ing Comador's liability to the administrix 
made her subsequent wrongful death action 
against Comador a sham. Burkett v. Crulo 
Trucking Company, Inc., Ind.App. 355 N.E.2d 
253 (1976). Neither Comador nor the primary 
insurer which purported to defend the action, 
had any interest whatsoever in the outcome. 
577 F.2d at page 423. 
Similarly, in the instant case, Holiday's exposure 
for damages was terminated by its settlement agreement and 
payment of $15,000.00. The further entry of the sham judgment 
and other proceedings cannot effect the obligation of Airport 
Shuttle whatsoever. 
This court has not specifically considered the 
validity of a contrived settlement of this type, even when it 
is alleged against an insurer. However, in the case of Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982), this court recognized 
the danger of sham and inflated judgments being awarded in 
third-party proceedings and then asserted against insurance 
The Lima case involved a situation where plaintiff 
was injured in a motor vehicle accident by an uninsured driver, 
Chambers. Chambers appeared pro se. Prudential was the 
uninsured motor carrier for plaintiff. Plaintiff's attorney 
obtained an affidavit from Chambers to the effect that he was 
liable for the accident and proposed to proceed against him in 
order to secure a large judgment. Plaintiff then antici-
pated turning to Prudential for payment of the judgment. The 
issue came to this court on Prudential's right to intervene in 
the lawsuit and affirmatively defend on Chambers' behalf. 
This court recognized the danger of allowing a party 
to "set-up" an insurance company by proceeding to a judgment 
which would be asserted against the insurance company and 
without allowing the insured to participate in the liability 
and damage assessment. 
These issues are closely analagous to those involved 
in the present situation. It is clear that the interest of 
Airport Shuttle and those of the party it must indemnify were 
highly divergent at the time of settlement. Holiday's primary 
interest was not to minimize the judgment involved or even 
negotiate it in good faith, but rather to stipulate to whatever 
inflated judgment plaintiff might desire in order to secure a 
covenant not to execute. As the judgment entered by Judge 
Fishier on October 1, 1982 indicates, Airport Shuttle's 
attorney was present during these proceedings but was denied 
standing in participation. 
The danger of allowing such a continued, set-up 
settlements subject to covenants not to execute is readily 
apparent. Such settlements run counter to the fair adjudi-
cation of legitimate claims. 
POINT III 
JUDGE DANIELS1 DETERMINATION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Judge Daniels1 order in this case granted Airport 
Shuttle's motion for summary judgment which necessarily 
required a denial of plaintiff's motion. The basis of that 
determination is fully brief supra. Nevertheless, additional 
legal foundation is present for the denial of plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment which were not reached by Judge Daniels 
due to his ruling on the motion for Airport Shuttle. 
THE CONTRIVED JUDGMENT ENTERED INTO BY HOLIDAY AND 
PLAINTIFF IS EXCESSIVE ON ITS FACE AND A PATENT SHAM. 
Airport Shuttle submits that the stipulated judgment 
of $246,000.00 in favor of plaintiff against Holiday Rent-A-Car 
herein is clearly excessive from a brief overview of the facts 
before the court. This case involves medical specials at the 
time of settlement, totalling approximately $5,Q00.00f which 
had been primarily incurred for psychiatric treatment and 
physical therapy. Plaintiff had an off and on work history 
prior to the accident and immediately prior had been employed 
for just six weeks at a job paying minimum wage. (Tr. 23.) 
Plaintiff suffered no broken bones, no nerve impairment, no 
disc injury, and had been diagnosed by at least one of her 
doctors as suffering from psychosomatic pain. Airport Shuttle 
submits that the court may take judicial notice that a settle-
ment of approximately a quarter million dollars in the face of 
such evidence is most unusual and bears a substantial taint of 
collusion. 
Even in those cases cited by plaintiffs supporting 
stipulated judgments against insurance companies, it is clearly 
stated that such stipulated judgments shall be upheld only if 
obtained without fraud or collusion. Metcalf v. Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co., supra Coblentz v. American Surety 
£o., 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969). 
In the instant case, the claimed settlement figure is 
totally disproportionate to the medical special damages 
involved. At the pre-trial settlement conference held before 
Judge Croft on August 13, 1982, plaintiff's initial settlement 
demand was approximately one-third of this stipulated amount. 
A review of the facts of this settlement further 
indicates its collusive nature. Under the settlement, plain-
tiff relieved Holiday from liability for any damages in 
exchange for the payment of $15,000.00. What was plaintiff's 
motivation for this act? If, in fact, as is claimed, plaintiff 
believed the case was worth substantially more than this 
amount, why would they agree to accept just $15,000.00 from the 
responsible party? Why would plaintiff not proceed with her 
case against both parties and get the judgment she thought she 
was entitled to? Airport Shuttle submits that the settlement 
was not motivated by charitable considerations plaintiff had 
towards Holiday. Rather, the clear motivation was to secure a 
$15,000.00 settlement for plaintiff and then attempt to 
"set-up" Airport Shuttle for a collusive and excessive settle-
ment figure. 
At a minimum, it is apparent that there are signifi-
cant facts at issue regarding the collusive nature of this 
settlement. As pointed out in Point IV of Airport Shuttle's 
reply memorandum in the court below, Airport Shuttle, at a 
minimum, is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery and 
participate in an open hearing as to the reasons and founda-
tions for the quarter million dollar figure. Specifically, 
such discovery will require depositions from those attorneys 
and parties participating in the settlement as to the infor-
mation available to them and as to why plaintiff had been 
prepared to settle for $85,000.00 or less a month and a half 
prior to the entry of this judgment and Holiday only offered a 
combined amount of $15,000.00 and then a month and a half later 
the parties agreed to a judgment of $246,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
This case, which began as a straightforward personal 
injury action has been contorted and confused by a settlement 
agreement designed to give plaintiff a windfall judgment 
against Rex Howell and Harold Hinckley, dba Airport Shuttle. 
However, a review of that settlement agreement makes 
clear that the total exposure and the loss suffered by Holiday 
in this matter is $15,000.00. As such, Holiday's damage 
arising from a lack of insurance coverage in this case, is in 
the amount of $15,000.00. Any assignment or machination of 
Holiday and plaintiff cannot increase the damage suffered or 
the exposure. 
Airport Shuttle's liability to Holiday for the breach 
of contract of procured insurance is restricted to the actual 
damages Holiday has incurred. Those damages being in the 
amount of $15f000.00, Judge Daniels' award of summary judgment 
was accordingly entered. 
The fact that Holiday Rent-A-Car, after signing its 
settlement agreement and receiving a covenant not to execute 
chose, voluntarily, without obligation under its agreements, 
elected to stipulate to a judgment for almost a quarter million 
dollars as against itself can have no effect whatsoever on the 
obligations of Airport Shuttle herein. 
Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell, dba Airport Shuttle 
are not an insurance company and did not and could not enter 
into a contract directly insuring Holiday. These gentlemen had 
none of the special duties which are imposed by law on 
insurance companies such as the duty to defend, the duty to 
settle in good faith, etc. 
Airport Shuttle conducted its defense in this action 
in the only way reasonably possible. That is, it prepared to 
go forward with trial with plaintiff and Holiday. While 
Airport Shuttle retained its defensive claims against Holiday, 
it was prepared and ready to go forward and assist in the 
defense of plaintiff's primary cause of action against Holiday. 
This position and orderly conduct of litigation thwarted by a 
collusive settlement between plaintiff and defendant in an 
effort to "set-up" Airport Shuttle for a huge judgment. As a 
consequence of this settlement, plaintiff's case has never 
been tried on the merits and plaintiff is attempting to 
collect the grossly excessive judgment against Airport Shuttle, 
Such an effort is contrary to the fair adjudication 
of justice and should not be countenanced by this court. 
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